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ABSTRACT
This report summarizes the discussions, open issues, take-away
messages, and conclusions of the 2nd SCAV workshop.
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1. ORGANIZATIONAL SUMMARY
Retrospect of SCAV’17. Our main goal was to frame the not so
clearly defined problem of safe autonomous vehicle (AV) control.
From the 1st SCAV workshop [3], we were able to determine key
challenges as summarized in a report in [2].
SCAV’18. This year, we focused on applied formal verifica-
tion of AV controllers as well as on discussing their fault-
tolerance and assurance. We give an overview of the achievements
and identify further issues in the verification of AV control.
Our blind peer review process included 3 to 4 reviews per paper,
including occasional shepherding. We were able to accept 6 out
of 8 submissions. The program is outlined in Table 1 and docu-
mented in [1]. For SCAV’18,1 we again asked paper authors to act
as discussants for initiating the question & answer sessions after
each talk. This way, the discussions appeared more lively because
authors get to know each others’ works more closely.
Khalil Ghorbal from the INRIA group2 for Hybrid Modeling and
Contract-Based Design for Multi-physics Embedded Systems gave
an excellent keynote on the state-of-the-art of invariant check-
ing and generation for non-linear systems, pointing at current
challenges. His presentation on Simulating and Verifying Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPSs): Current Challenges and Novel Research
Directions shed light on steps to take towards industrial-scale
CPSs and provided a smooth transition to our morning session.
Acknowledgments. Latest at this point, we would like to thank
all the authors and presenters3 for putting great effort in their
talks as well as our discussants and the audience for posing the
right questions and pointing out important issues. Furthermore,
our program committee4 deserves sincere gratitude for their great
∗Preprint submitted to ACM SIGSOFT SEN.
†Supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) un-
der the Grant no. GL 915/1-1.
1See https://scav.in.tum.de.
2See https://team.inria.fr/hycomes.
3See the list of authors in the workshop proceedings [1].
4See the list of members and sub-reviewers in [1].
Table 1: Outlined workshop program
9:15 – 10:00 Keynote by Khalil Ghorbal
10:30 – 12:30 Morning session:
Modeling, verification, simulation
(3 talks)
14:00 – 15:30 Afternoon session:
Failure analysis, tolerance, safety argu-
mentation
(3 talks)
16:40 – 17:30 Discussion and tool demo
standards and careful work. Finally, we thank the CPSWeek 2018
organizers for a high-quality scientific event in a beautiful place
full of history: Porto in Portugal.
2. MAJOR APPROACHES TO AV SAFETY
In the following, we highlight four important classes of approaches
to AV safety—as well applicable to any other type of systems—
together with some notes offered to be taken away from the work-
shop contributions and our discussions [1].
When speaking of measures taken for safety assurance, some like
to use the term “product-based” to refer to the system under
development as the object to be delivered to a customer, and
“process-based” to refer to the engineering process or life cycle
of this system. We will align the following discussion with this
nomenclature.
2.1 Guaranteeing Reachability and Invariance
Here, we view AV safety as the problem of showing for a con-
trolled continuous dynamical physical system or a discrete state
transition system that, given an initial set,
1. a desired final set is always reached, and
2. a desired set (an invariant) will never be left,
through appropriate influence of the controller or decision pro-
cedure and, usually, under some additional constraints and the
influence of disturbances. The properties 1 and 2 describe what
is also called control stability. Safety measures taken are, in a
strong sense, “product-based” and focus the control application.
From our discussions, we like to mention some state-of-the-art
practices and challenges to be solved with good generality:
The Scaling of Reachability Algorithms and Increasing Ver-
ification Coverage. Research addresses techniques for set over-
and under-approximation to reduce “flowpipe”5 computation ef-
fort. Discretization schemes based on hyper-reals or hyper-dense
domains help reducing verification to decidable problems. How-
ever, the elaborate example of multi-lane traffic snapshots showed
us, how hard it is to efficiently cover the space of real-world sce-
narios coining initial sets and to keep the number of necessary
reachability checks low.
The Specification of Controller Performance. In distributed
control or with control technology relying on network communi-
cation, research is investigating the derivation of lowest bounds
of acceptable computational performance (e.g. communication re-
quirements) from given control loop characteristics.
The Reduction of Model Uncertainty and Increasing Verifi-
cation Confidence. We find it crucial to strengthen discussions
on
• identifying uncertainties in models,
• identifying validity errors in models (i.e. errors other than
syntactic or semantic inconsistencies), and
• fixing such errors and assuring sufficient model accuracy.
Model parameters are often conservatively estimated by domain
experts (e.g. parameters in probabilistic models). Because mod-
eling large systems is challenging, relying solely on expert knowl-
edge of such parameters is not a first class approach to reducing
model uncertainty and, hence, can drastically decrease the con-
fidence of any verification results. Clearly, on the other hand,
the determination of valid, ideally non-conservative, probabilities
of hardware/software failures and similar events is still far from
being a trivial issue.
The Transfer of Verification Results to Realistic Settings.
Open and flexible simulation platforms for autonomous systems
experimentation have shown to be a promising way for this. Par-
ticularly, SCAV’18 authors have discussed controller code synthe-
sis from Matlab Simulink6 to the ROS7 platform and simulation
in ROS’ RViz environment and the simulation engine Gazebo.8
It is not unusual to distinguish between three increasingly more
realistic stages of testing by simulation:
• model-in-the-loop (MIL),
• software-in-the-loop (SIL), and
• hardware-in-the-loop (HIL).
Because the assumptions made by these “loop simulations” are
increasingly more realistic and, typically, increasingly more ex-
pensive, it is important for test and verification engineers to iden-
tify the earliest of these stages at which critical aspects of an AV
5Approximation of a continuous dynamics given an initial set.
6See https://www.mathworks.com.
7See http://www.ros.org.
8See http://gazebosim.org.
control application can be effectively tested or verified. It is well-
known that late defect discovery is strongly positively correlated
with high costs of defect removal.
2.2 Fault-Avoidance and Fault-Tolerance
Here, we view AV safety as the problem of showing for a con-
troller architecture, design, or implementation that it ful-
fills a number of, ideally quantitative, constraints referred to as
dependability (incl. reliability) and security requirements. The
measures taken are typically “product-based” and focus on con-
troller technology. In practice, many of these constraints are ei-
ther difficult to identify, quantify, or specify; needless to say that
their fulfillment is very difficult in its own right.
Although, our discussions to that extent have been less extensive
than in SCAV’17 [2, 3], we like to mention a classical issue in-
vestigated in a new technical setting in one of the contributions:
For mixed-criticality applications using Ethernet technology and
software-defined networking (SDN), it was found that accept-
able fail-over performance in network reconfiguration is
achievable. Our discussion gives reason to believe that recent
developments in Ethernet technology may be a suitable option
for harmonizing currently heterogeneous and, hence, complex in-
vehicle networks.
An AV design determines the “items” that, across the disciplines
involved in AV engineering, define the contexts of verification
tasks. For example, functional safety pertains to electrical, elec-
tronic, and software parts of an AV. It is well-known that the de-
composition of a system into items correlates with the structure
of the organization developing this system. Undesired side-effects
of this phenomenon lead to gaps in the reasoning how local results
from, for example, functional safety improve the overall safety of
a control application. The inverse problem arises when deciding
about how a constraint characterizing the control application has
to be distributed across parts of a controller implementation.
2.3 Application of Normative Frameworks
Here, we view AV safety as the problem of showing that certain
guidelines, policies, standards, or regulations (presumably
accepted by the corresponding stakeholders and regulatory au-
thorities) have been followed in an engineering process and that
compliance of this process with such a normative framework is
the governing part in the assurance argument. Measures taken
are, hence, “process-based,” focusing the controller engineering
process.
Recent normative frameworks have shown deficiencies for some
applications that may have a dangerous impact on compliant
products as sold in the markets:
• Fail-operational concepts have been neglected in favor of
fail-silent assumptions compatible with more traditional
human-in-the-loop settings.
• Agile engineering practices have been postponed in favor of
rigid, waterfall-oriented processes, such as the V-model.
• Open source components can not yet be safely integrated
with proprietary embedded platforms.
However, in their applied forms, standards often lack clar-
ity (i.e. undesirable universality) in some places and over-
specification (i.e. undesirable restriction) in other places. This
circumstance deems them less helpful as a quality control mecha-
nism and in liability and accountability cases. Late availability of
the frameworks postpones evaluations of how the mentioned defi-
ciencies are mitigated and, more severely, whether the frameworks
comply with the state of the science.
While some frameworks are applicable to very specific types of
systems (e.g. four-wheel road vehicles), recent versions try to har-
monize regulations and transfer them to systems similar from the
viewpoint of functional safety, such as motor cycles. For exam-
ple, with ISO 26262 (version 2), we were unable to identify the
relation of unintended behavior and failure. Most likely, these
concepts are intertwined. Our discussion indicates that safety
assurance against failures and unintended behavior (also summa-
rized as malfunctioning behavior) and safety assurance of nominal
behavior should be accomplished in a single coherent framework
to identify subtle interference. To this end, it was unclear whether
the safety of the intended function (SOTIF) standard will address
any of the class of approaches according to Section 2.1.
2.4 Case-based Argumentation
Here, we view AV safety as the problem of constructing an indi-
vidual argument that the deployed controller is sufficiently free
of hazards or, similarly, that the controller is acceptably safe with
respect to the identified hazards. This individual argument results
from case-based explicit inductive or deductive reasoning
from evidence towards a desirable claim, or vice versa. The term
evidence refers to measures of any kind taken to substantiate or
refute such a claim. The adjective “explicit” is often understood
as the hierarchical visualization of this argument. This visualiza-
tion can, for example, be accomplished by using the Goal Struc-
turing Notation (GSN).9 Measures taken can be “product-” or
“process-based” and focus both the control application and the
controller implementation.
We like to mention an important issue pointed out in our dis-
cussion: Safety and, more generally, assurance cases, typically,
represent judgments of expert committees about the most prob-
able effects of the taken safety measures. Although such judg-
ments are structured by the argument, “judgmental” uncertainty
can well be injected through the evidence and reasoning strate-
gies used to construct the argument. “There is no guarantee” or,
in other words, case-based arguments also bear the tremendous
challenge of delivering an acceptable level of confidence.
3. COMBINING THESE APPROACHES
For sake of brevity, we decided not to include references in this
report. It is worth noting, the body of relevant literature on the
presented approaches is overwhelmingly large.
Anyway, the knowledgeable reader might find it quite easy to
see that these approaches to AV safety are related. However,
the character of these relations and their implications are far less
obvious. In summary, the mentioned approaches more or less
address two major objectives characterizing the field:
Assurance of Correctness. The approaches described in the
Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 provide capabilities to accomplish the
technical part of safe AV control, that is, provide sufficient or
compelling evidence that an AV controller implementation actu-
ally fulfills its specification, not necessarily questioning the ac-
ceptability or validity of this specification. Such a specification
9See http://www.goalstructuringnotation.info.
can be seen as a model and such a model, in most of the practical
cases, only captures part of the reality in its assumptions. This
way, we again refer to the well-known fact that “absolute safety”
cannot be guaranteed.
Assurance of Societal Agreeableness. Importantly, in addi-
tion to the first objective, the approaches described in the Sec-
tions 2.3 and 2.4 provide capabilities for the interaction of system
vendors, regulatory authorities, and scientific institutions with
public society. A result of such an interaction can, for example,
be an agreed definition and specification of what it means for an
AV controller to be “acceptably safe” or, in other words, of what
it means for safety risks in AV control to be “as low as reasonably
practicable”10 in a given operational context.
The workshop talks and our discussions highlighted important
steps towards effective combinations of the approaches mentioned
in the Sections 2.1 to 2.4:
• We have discussed the integration of approximations
of system dynamics with fault models of AV controller
implementations. While such approaches are very promis-
ing, we believe they will only be of practical use if they can
clearly show how to deal with complex fault domains, more-
over, how they can effectively relate these domains with the
approximated physical loop dynamics.
• Regarding simulation platforms used in practice, we point
to the challenge of combining test and simulation with
formal verification and vice versa.
• We crossed the topic of complexity and real-time per-
formance crucial for on-line applications of the discussed
verification algorithms.
Conclusion. Our empirical insights and feedback from inter-
views suggest that practitioners in charge of AV control assurance
need to be equipped with and educated in stronger methods than
they are currently applying to challenge assurance scalability.
In conclusion, a sound combination of the aforementioned
approaches can be seen as a grand challenge and a necessity if we
like to push AV control, in particular, and autonomous systems
control, in general, to a degree of safety desirable and acceptable
in public and domestic spaces. Automated and integrated
formal methods can play a central role in this context.
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